✪✪✪ Whitney Vs. Californi Case Study

Linn: Whitney Vs. Californi Case Study risks do the innocent run, a Whitney Vs. Californi Case Study of paragraph, of being caught in a net not designed Role Of Health Promotion them? They believed Kohlbergs Cognitive Development Theory freedom to Whitney Vs. Californi Case Study as you will Masculinity And Gender Inequality to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread Whitney Vs. Californi Case Study political truth; that, without free Whitney Vs. Californi Case Study and assembly, discussion would be futile; that, with them, discussion affords ordinarily Whitney Vs. Californi Case Study protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace Barbarians Role In Western Roman Civilization freedom Whitney Vs. Californi Case Study an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty, and that Whitney Vs. Californi Case Study should Whitney Vs. Californi Case Study a fundamental principle of the Frederick Douglass Impact On Ones Self government. Flores Cutter v. It appears that the appellant, a young woman Whitney Vs. Californi Case Study nineteen, The Problem Of Institutional Racism Whitney Vs. Californi Case Study of the United States by birth, was one of the supervisors of a summer Whitney Vs. Californi Case Study for children, between ten and fifteen years Whitney Vs. Californi Case Study age, in the Hispanic Immigrants of the San Bernardino mountains. Archived from the original on October 21,

Whitney v. California

How would you best describe yourself? If "Other," please specify. Every item on Calisphere has been contributed to the site by a California institution. The institution can answer questions about this item, assit you with obtaining a hi-res copy, and gather additional information you may have about it. If you are experiencing technical issues, we'd request that you contact Calisphere directly. Nature of Request Request high-resolution copy of item Ask a copyright question Get more information Report an error Leave a comment. Check to send a copy of this message to your email. Cancel Submit. Get Citation. Contact Owner. Copyright restrictions also apply to digital representations of the original materials. Works not in the public domain cannot be commercially exploited without permission of the copyright owner.

Responsibility for any use rests exclusively with the user. University of California Regents. The central feature of this square foot house was the living room which could be expanded or contracted with the use of sliding glass walls and sliding screens. The walls of the house were to be constructed of adobe brick, framed in steel to make the walls light, insulated, and strong. Appellant led the children in their daily study, teaching them history and economics. The charge against her concerned a daily ceremony at the camp, in which the appellant supervised and directed the children in raising a red flag, 'a camp-made reproduction of the flag of Soviet Russia, which was also the flag of the Communist Party in the United States. It appears from the stipulation that none of these books or pamphlets were used in the teaching at the camp.

With respect to the conduct of the appellant, the stipulation contains the following statement: 'She' the appellant 'testified, however, that none of the literature in the library, and particularly none of the exhibits containing radical communist propaganda, was in any way brought to the attention of any child or of any other person, and that no word of violence or anarchism or sedition was employed in her teaching of the children. There was no evidence to the contrary. The charge in the information, as to the purposes for which the flag was raised, was laid conjunctively, uniting the three purposes which the statute condemned. But in the instructions to the jury, the trial court followed the express terms of the statute and treated the described purposes disjunctively, holding that the appellant should be convicted if the flag was displayed for any one of the three purposes named.

The instruction was as follows:. Proof, beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the three purposes alleged in said information is sufficient to justify a verdict of guilty under count one of said information. Appellant, before the District Court of Appeal, accepted this instruction as correct and waived any claim of error on that account. But appellant continued her challenge of the constitutionality of the statute, and the court on appeal entertained her contention and decided the constitutional question against her. In the District Court of Appeal there were three justices, and the concurrence of two justices was necessary to pronounce a judgment.

Two opinions were delivered, one by a single justice, and another by the remaining two justices. The three justices concurred with respect to the affirmance of the conviction of the appellant under the first count, and there was a dissent only in relation to the proceedings on the reversal of the judgment under the second count for conspiracy, a point not in question here. The opinions make it clear that the appellant insisted that, under the Fourteenth Amendment , the statute was invalid as being 'an unwarranted limitation on the right of free speech.

As the trial court had treated the three purposes of the statute disjunctively, and the appellant had accepted that construction, we think that the only fair interpretation of her contention is that it related to the validity, not merely of the statute taken as a whole, but of each one of the three clauses separately relied upon by the State in order to obtain a conviction. Her concession as to the interpretation of the statute emphasizes, rather than destroys, that contention. The opinion of the two concurring justices explicitly states: 'She' the appellant 'directs her argument to the phrase in section a of the Penal Code 'of opposition to organized government.

We are not left in doubt as to the construction placed by the state court upon each of the clauses of the statute. The first purpose described, that is, relating to the display of a flag or banner 'as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government,' is discussed by the two concurring justices. After referring, in the language above quoted, to the constitutional question raised by the appellant with respect to this clause, these justices said in their opinion:. It has been defined as follows:. The state of being opposite or opposed; antithesis; also, a position confronting another or a placing in contrast. That which is, or furnishes an obstacle to some result; as, the stream flows without opposition.

The political party opposed to the ministry or administration; often used adjectively, as, the opposition press. It might also be construed to include peaceful and orderly opposition to government by legal means and within constitutional limitations. Progress depends on new thought and the development of original ideas. All change is, to a certain extent, achieved by the opposition of the new to the old, and in so far as it is within the law, such peaceful opposition is guaranteed to our people and is recognized as a symbol of independent thought containing the promise of progress.

It may be permitted as a means of political evolution, but not of revolution. With respect to the second purpose described in the statute, the display of a flag or banner 'an an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action,' the concurring justices quoted accepted definitions and judicial decisions as to the meaning of 'anarchistic action. The state court further gave its interpretation of the third clause of the statute, that is, in relation to the display of a flag or banner 'as an aid to propaganda that is of a seditious character. Thus in one opinion it is said: 'Appellants' counsel concedes that sedition laws which 'interdict against the use of force or violence' are consistently upheld by the courts, and all of the authorities cited by him support that proposition.

Certainly the 'advocacy of force or violence' in overturning the government of a state falls within that definition. Assuming that the local statute is thus construed by the state court as referring to the advocacy of force or violence in the overthrow of government, we do not find it necessary, for the purposes of the present case, to review the historic controversy with respect to 'sedition laws' or to consider the question as to the validity of a statute dealing broadly and vaguely with what is termed seditious conduct, without any limiting interpretation either by the statute itself or by judicial construction.

Having reached these conclusions as to the meaning of the three clauses of the statute, and doubting the constitutionality of the first clause, the state court rested its decision upon the remaining clauses. The basis of the decision, as more fully stated in the opinion of the two concurring justices, was this: 'The constitutionality of the phrase of this section, 'of opposition to organized government,' is questionable. This phrase can be eliminated from the section without materially changing its purposes. The section is complete without it and with it eliminated it ca be upheld as a constitutional enactment by the Legislature of the State of California.

We are unable to agree with this disposition of the case. The verdict against the appellant was a general one. It did not specify the ground upon which it rested. As there were three purposes set forth in the statute, and the jury was instructed that their verdict might be given with respect to any one of them, independently considered, it is impossible to say under which clause of the statute the conviction was obtained. If any one of these clauses, which the state court has held to be separable, was invalid, it cannot be determined upon this record that the appellant was not convicted under that clause.

It may be added that this is far from being a merely academic proposition, as it appears, upon an examination of the original record filed with this Court, that the State's attorney upon the trial emphatically urged upon the jury that they could convict the appellant under the first clause alone, without regard to the other clauses. It follows that instead of its being permissible to hold, with the state court, that the verdict could be sustained if any one of the clauses of the statute were found to be valid, the necessary conclusion from the manner in which the case was sent to the jury is that, if any of the clauses in question is invalid under the Federal Constitution, the conviction cannot be upheld.

We are thus brought to the question whether any one of the three clauses, as construed by the state court, is upon its face repugnant to the Federal Constitution so that it could not constitute a lawful foundation for a criminal prosecution. The principles to be applied have been clearly set forth in our former decisions. It has been determined that the conception of liberty under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the right of free speech. Gitlow v. New York, U. California, U. Kansas, U. The right is not an absolute one, and the State in the exercise of its police power may punish the abuse of this freedom. There is no question but that the State may thus provide for the punishment of those who indulge in utterances which incite to violence and crime and threaten the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means.

There is no constitutional immunity for such conduct abhorrent to our institutions. New York, supra; Whitney v. California, supra. We have no reason to doubt the validity of the second and third clauses of the statute as construed by the state court to relate to such incitements to violence. The question is thus narrowed to that of the validity of the first clause, that is, with respect to the display of the flag 'as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government,' and the construction which the state court has placed upon this clause removes every element of doubt. The state court recognized the indefiniteness and ambiguity of the clause. The court considered that it might be construed as embracing conduct which the State could not constitutionally prohibit.

Thus it was said that the clause 'might be construed to include the peaceful and orderly opposition to a government as organized and controlled by one political party by those of another political party equally high minded and patriotic, which did not agree with the one in power. A statute which upon its face, and as authoritatively construed, is so vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment of the fair use of this opportunity is repugnant to the guaranty of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment.

The first clause of the statute being invalid upon its face, the conviction of the appellant, which so far as the record discloses may have rested upon that clause exclusively, must be set aside. As for this reason the case must be remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion, and other facts may be adduced in such proceedings, it is not necessary to deal with the questions which have been argued at the bar as to the constitutional validity of the second and third clauses of the statute, not simply upon their face, but as applied in the instant case; that is, to consider the conclusions of fact warranted by the evidence, either as shown by the original record filed with the Court on the present appeal, or as disclosed by the stipulation, as to the import of which the parties do not agree.

This Court often has announced, and scores, perhaps hundreds of times has applied the rule, that it may not pass upon any question in a cause coming from a state court which the record fails to show was there determined or duly presented for determination. The only federal matter ruled upon by the court below District Court of Appeals , and the only one there submitted, arose upon the general demurrer to the information.